3rd May 2019
Outside Fortress Europe Excerpt
This second End Note Global Business Strategy Blog essay is based upon unabridged excerpts from Chapter Eleven, A Strategic Perspective on Managing Change, in Outside Fortress Europe: Strategies for the Global Market.
Outside Fortress Europe Excerpt
A striking if not surprising feature of the business and management literature in recent years has been the pervasiveness of the concept of ‘change’ and its many semantic variants, for example, ‘transformation’, ‘transitional’, ‘break-the-china’, ‘stop-the-rot’, ‘transfiguration’ and so on, ad nauseam, ad absurdum. Despite the proliferation of change models or its synonym-stretching meaning, the dimensions of change are essentially twofold:
- Antecedents, i.e. those factors which ‘trigger’ the need for change.
- Change as a process, i.e. a set of management actions which transform an organization from its current situation to a desired state over a sustained period of time.
We will discuss each dimension in turn, but first a caveat. One of the most respected writers on change management has been Rosabeth Moss Kanter, whose early work (1983, 1989) essentially defined the topic or at least brought it to its broader public domain. In a highly influential text on how companies experience change alongside exploring the role of leadership in guiding it, she and her Harvard colleagues drew attention to the shallowness of much of the discussion of change in the mainstream literature. In the light of the concluding remarks of the previous chapter, Kanter et al. are worth quoting at length here as a preface to the strategic and organizational challenges of change which we explore in this Chapter (Kanter et al., 2001):
… the danger lurking in many discussions of organizational change is that the whole thing starts to sound much simpler than it is. Too much credit is given to leaders when things go well, and too much blame when they go poorly. Yet, despite decades of very good advice to organizations about change, we are struck by how many failures there are and how much can go wrong. Even though both the reformers and the revolutionaries are, in their own way, utopians, believing in organizational perfectibility, the sad fact is that, almost universally, organizations change as little as they must, rather than as much as they should.
The dimensions of change are captured on two axes of our previously introduced nexus (interdependencies) model. The change antecedents, the oft-called ‘triggers’ of change, are rooted in the relationship between the organization and its environmental context. The change process, meanwhile, is rooted within the organization-strategy axis and is modelled in the Process category illustrated in Figure 1 which, as we demonstrated in Chapter One, also captures the key dimensions of global business strategy.
(See The Global Business Strategy Album foundation essay The dimensions of global business strategy for insights and discussion).
Mapping change antecedents: Dynamics of the environment-organization axis
The first point to emphasise here is the importance of the word ‘dynamics’ in this section’s title. It is intuitively appealing and, to a large extent, empirically proven (see Chapter Four, Theories of Strategy and Competition and later sections here) that stable business environments deliver stable organizational form, normally postulated as mechanistic-type structures, while turbulent environments require flexible, or organic, type structures. The key points of debate, however, are how far the level of turbulence in the business environment can be objectively measured and to what extent organizations can sensitise themselves for effective monitoring and evaluation of such turbulence (see Chapter Eight, Implementing Global Business Strategy).
(For further insights here, see the first Global Business Strategy Album foundation essay: Risk, uncertainty, the strategy challenge and organizational response).
Considering turbulent business environments, different perceptions of a notionally objective reality could lead to a strategically inappropriate response, in the sense of either strategy-market fit and/or organizational capability. For example, flight from a (perceived) mature domestic market via a global business strategy is seen as the key growth vector for a company and acquisition is proposed as the most appropriate route to achieve it. In market and opportunity cost terms, the resource could have been better allocated to organic development and concentric diversification (leveraging existing capabilities and assets), thus exploiting strong customer loyalty. In terms of organization, the fact that the company has had no previous experience of large-scale post-acquisition integration and management suggests a weak ‘fit’ between the ‘opportunity’ and organizational competence.
In this example, failure becomes predictable, at least to the outside, impartial observer. At a deeper level of analysis, however, identifying the principal cause of failure is a trickier task:
- The economic signals emanating from the domestic market (market growth, concentration, size etc.) could have been misinterpreted.
- As a matter of fact, the acquiring company lacked acquisition experience.
- The acquired company possibly had a cadre of influential managers who fiercely resisted the change to be imposed on them.
- The management information systems of the two companies (essential for post-acquisition coordination and control) could have been incompatible.
- The cultures of the organizations could have proven extremely difficult or impossible to assimilate.
This is a good example, and a real one: VW’s more or less simultaneous acquisitions of Skoda and Seat discussed in Chapter Five, Analysing Global Markets and the Intelligent Company. Many commentators now present this VW acquisition as a remarkable success story and there is no doubt that Skoda has achieved great inroads in building strong market positions in many countries, especially in emerging markets where there have been no ‘legacy’ negative brand issues (see Chapter Six, Strategic Marketing and Global Brand Management and the discussion relating to ‘country-of-origin’ impact on brand perceptions). But these post hoc rationalisations universally ignore the huge debts incurred by VW at the time and the massive write-down (provision) which significantly eroded shareholder value – forever. Furthermore, the ongoing development of the cash-cow VW Golf (and its GTi heritage) was neglected with the consequential loss of domestic (German) market share to Nissan, the Japanese company exporting from its UK plant to Germany within the boundaries of ‘Fortress Europe’.
(For insights into post-acquisition integration and M&As more generally, see The Global Business Strategy Album post: Deutsche Bank & Commerzbank: what explains the urge to merge?).
The VW-Skoda case scenario is also an ideal example to illustrate what Kanter et al. (2001) describe as three dynamics which typically activate (trigger) the change process in organizations:
- The development of the organization in its entirety relates to ‘motion’ in its environment: change that is macro-evolutionary, historical and typically related to clusters or whole industries.
- The motion of parts in the organization in relation to one another as the organization grows, ages, and progresses through its life-cycle: change that is micro-evolutionary, developmental, and typically related to its size or shape, resulting in coordination issues.
- The jockeying for power and struggle for control among individuals and groups with a stake in the organization to make decisions or enjoy benefits as an expression of their own interests: change that focuses on (organizational) political elements and involves revolutionary dimensions.
This trichotomy also reinforces the fundamental theme of this book (articulated in the previous Chapter, Theories of Organizational Behaviour and Strategic Management), which is that ‘strategic management’ is essentially an amalgam of industrial economics (strategic imperatives) and organizational behaviour (strategic impediments/enablers). This, in turn, suggests an economic determinism, a perspective which lies at the heart of the change debate, i.e. the extent to which a company shapes, or is shaped by, its environmental context.
In a competitive economic model (e.g. capitalism) the causation is typically the latter route, i.e. environments have primacy and shape strategic choice and organizational form (see Chapter Four, Theories of Strategy and Competition, for a discussion of the dynamics associated with competitive markets).
A key question which then emerges is how far the managerial response is a proactive or reactive posture, an issue characterised by Kanter and her colleagues as “Looking Backward or Looking Forward”:
Ultimately, despite the limits upon what people can control, it is still up to people to act, and in acting they do more than predict the future, they invent it.
The notion that organizational futures can be created provides the ‘strategic’ perspective of this chapter. In the remaining sections, the emphasis will be on the issues associated with the management of the change process within given organizational contexts. The role of leadership in managing change permeates the chapter as a recurrent theme, i.e. although there is no specific section devoted to it this doesn’t mean that it is unimportant (but see Chapter Eight, Implementing Global Business Strategy, for insights). Indeed, in the absence of effective leadership, organizational transformation programmes are almost certain to fail (see Kotter, 2012, for his updated seminal text on this aspect of change management).
The learning organization
The emergence of ‘new ideas’ in management theory is invariably paralleled by conflicting claims for the original structuring of the concepts. This is certainly true of ‘the learning organization’, an idea which rapidly diffused throughout the academic community and amongst business practitioners in the 1990s. The learning organization is a concept which has grown hugely in awareness but which has struggled for definitional clarity. One of the most fully developed and largely uncontested versions of the concept to date was articulated by Peter Senge of MIT as long ago as 1990 and considerably updated with extensive empirical evidence in support of its major contentions and new content in 2006. In the following sections, we adopt Senge’s definition and examine his propositions before critically analysing the conceptual and practical limitations of his broader thesis. For Senge (2006), learning organizations are:
Organizations where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together.
Senge sees two principal driving forces behind the emergence of learning organizations, one deterministic the other humanistic. Regarding the deterministic dimension, it is claimed that globalization of the world economy and the increasingly dynamic and complex context of international business demands that ‘organization’ and the work processes it encompasses become more ‘learningful’. The humanistic perspective emerges from the inherent capabilities of organizations to meet higher-order societal needs, as evidenced by the following statement Senge cites from a corporate president he interviewed during his research:
Why can’t we do good works at work? Business is the only institution that has a chance, as far as I can see, to fundamentally improve the injustice that exists in the world. But first, we will have to move through the barriers that are keeping us from being truly vision-led and capable of learning.
Senge has argued that the conditions for such learning are now in place as the core capabilities such organizations must have are increasingly being understood. The key, though, is mastery of “the disciplines of the learning organization”. By way of metaphor, we know that exercise is good for us, but we still need to set the alarm for that early-morning run.
‘Commercialising’ the learning organization
Drawing on a classic engineering metaphor, whereby invention constitutes the creation of an idea while innovation describes the commercialisation of an idea, Senge argues that the notion of organizational learning has only really reached the former state. As a way of doing business, however, he claims that organizational learning is ripe for harvesting in its second sense – commercialisation – by firms who can harness the following five disciplines to capture sustainable competitive advantage:
- Systems Thinking: Senge notes the tendency of managers to focus on individual events – snapshots in time – rather than considering broader-based patterns of change.
- Personal Mastery: Characterised as a “special level of proficiency”, personal mastery is posited as the cornerstone of the learning organization, its “spiritual foundation”. Like Peters and Waterman, Senge observes what he describes as the ‘vast’ untapped potential of people in organizations: “Here, I am most interested in the connections between personal learning and organizational learning, in the reciprocal commitments between individual and organization, and in the special spirit of an enterprise made up of learners”.
- Mental Models: These are the subconscious assumptions and generalisations which guide managers’ interpretations and actions. They are deeply ingrained and frequently prevent companies from seeing, let alone executing, market opportunities. They also provide a major barrier to appropriate changes in outmoded organizational practices. The challenge, then, is to unearth these internal pictures and scrutinise them in a balanced process of inquiry and advocacy.
- Building Shared Views: The vision should be genuine and encourage people to excel and learn. The discipline of shared vision involves unearthing “pictures of the future”, it requires a detailed set of principles and guiding practices and must foster commitment and enrolment. Attempts at dictating a vision and seeking compliance in the absence of belief will be counter-productive.
- Team Learning: The discipline of team learning is underpinned by effective dialogue, a process which requires that team members suspend assumptions and identify those patterns of interaction that undermine learning. This discipline is seen as vital since teams are the fundamental learning unit in modern organizations, yet individualism remains pervasive and team members tend to be very defensive. As Senge questions: “How can a team of committed managers with individual IQs above 120 have a collective IQ of 63?”.
Developing his engineering metaphor, Senge equates “discipline” with technologies and business processes, i.e. those components which constitute the entity. In the concept of the learning organization, then, disciplines embrace “a body of theory and technique that must be studied and mastered to be put into practice”. Disciplines are tangible in the sense that they provide a developmental path for the acquisition of appropriate skills and competencies. The disciplines outlined by Senge depart from the traditional management disciplines of accounting since they embrace additive and collective learning and deal with how individuals think and interact with one another. In this sense, the disciplines of the learning organization are more akin to artistic disciplines than the traditional, science-based disciplines of management. By definition, the process of developing the learning organization is continuous since, as the disciplines converge, they trigger a new wave of experimentation and advancement.
The ‘Fifth Discipline’ of Senge’s title is systems thinking, the integrative agency which underpins the relationship of the disciplines with each other and to the outside world. The systemic perspective empowers managers to believe that they can shape the company’s future, but it also challenges them to see how their own actions create the problems they experience, i.e. it forces them to seek explanations, not proffer excuses.
Senge acknowledges that, while the concepts of the learning organization are well-grounded, the practice of building learning organizations remains challenging, even a quarter of a century after the original ideas were articulated. Moreover, systems thinking cannot be appended to an organization as a panacea for curing past and current ailments. Putting the principles of the learning organization into practice requires ‘metanoia’, a shift in mindset that builds on learning as adaptation to embrace learning as generative. Put simply, it enhances the organization’s capacity to shape its own future. In developing the concept of the learning organization, Senge identified seven institutional barriers to its adoption. He describes these somewhat provocatively as “learning disabilities”, arguing that they are characteristic of many organizations and that, in large measure, they tend to go undetected. These hurdles to effective adoption of the learning organization concept are outlined below:
- I Am My Position. Over time people tend to confuse what they do with who they are. This has two key implications. First, if the nature of work changes, individuals often lack the capacity to change. This is a problem and has been since the onset of the industrial revolution when new technologies redefined work processes. Second, when individuals focus only on their positional task, for example, component assembly, they feel little responsibility for the finished product. If the latter works fine but fails to sell, the component assembler passes blame elsewhere. In many cases positions are institutionalised by unions into ‘demarcation’ formats, whereby refusal to move beyond the boundaries of positional tasks is legitimised.
- The Enemy is Out There. This disability is a manifestation of the previous one since the reluctance of individuals or groups to accept responsibility for failure normally means that the blame must be assigned elsewhere. This could be directed internally so, for example, blame shifts between manufacturing and marketing. Or it could be external, for example, ‘the unions’, ‘the management’, ‘the government’, ‘the Japanese’ or – in the worst case – ‘the customers’! This tendency of ‘passing the buck’ prevents the core problem from being identified and, worse still, restricts the exploitation of the organization’s potential to master its external environment.
- The Illusion of Taking Charge. Challenging the myth of the proactive manager, Senge argues that proactiveness is more often than not reactive management in disguise. While it might be pre-emptive, it often involves nothing more than taking a more aggressive stance towards the “enemy out there”, the mythical threat introduced above. Conceptually, true proactiveness involves analysis of how managers and organizations contribute to their own problems, i.e. it should be seen as “a way of thinking” and not, as is so often the case in management practice, as an emotional state.
- The Fixation of Events. This ‘disability’ is a function of psychological conditioning and fundamentally underpins the short-termism typical of many organizations. Seeing life as a series of events leads managers to seek one obvious cause for each happening. Since the most serious threats to organizations come from slow gradual processes – from combinations of events converging over time – a focus on discrete items inhibits correct diagnosis of core problems. This inability to “see the wood for the trees” is a major barrier to creativity and prevents generative learning, the fundamental concept of the learning organization thesis.
- The Parable of the Boiled Frog. This story is often told to demonstrate the terminal impact of failing to see the cumulative effects of the gradual processes discussed above. The frog is conditioned by nature to be responsive to sudden environment changes (single events). Place one in a pan of boiling water and its instinct will impel it to clamber out. Place the frog in a pan of water at room temperature, turn up the heat and witness a transformation from contentment to death. The frog becomes impervious to its surroundings and the latter’s shift from being favourable (warmth) to hostile (intense heat). The parable is used to describe the demise of both companies and industries, an example of the latter being the inability of the Swiss Watch industry to perceive the threat of new entrants (the Japanese) or innovative substitutes (quartz), the latter now widely known as disruptive technologies and business processes – see the discussion of disruptive technologies and tipping points in Chapter Five, Analysing Global Markets and the Intelligent Company. (For a brief overview of the key issues here, see The Global Business Strategy Album post: Disruptive business processes & ‘tipping points’: Customer preference is sovereign!).
- The Delusion of Learning from Experience. Although “learning by doing” is one of the most powerful developmental tools it requires the experience of consequences, not just actions. This is the fundamental premise of “trial and error” learning techniques, whereby competence is formed through continuous adaptations as a result of cumulative experience. If the consequences of our actions are not readily apparent or are beyond our “learning horizon”, then the feedback shortage which occurs creates what Senge describes as the core learning dilemma confronting organizations: “We learn best from experience, but we never directly experience the consequences of many of our most important decisions”. This problem is compounded with regard to the most critical decisions since the impact of these have consequences throughout the organizational system for many years. To cope with systemic complexity, organizations create functional hierarchies, a division of labour to facilitate decision-making and experiential learning. An unfortunate corollary of this is that functions become fiefdoms, learning is confined and constrained, and an organization’s most complex problems – cross-functional in character – are handled badly or simply ignored.
- The Myth of the Management Team. A common solution taken by many organizations to address the above dilemmas is the creation of “top teams”, typically a broad cross-section of senior managers who represent different functions and areas of expertise. In practice, however, such teams spend a disproportionate amount of time ‘fighting for turf’. While giving an appearance of cohesiveness, the reality is somewhat different. Team members avoid contributions that will put them in a bad light; they avoid public statements of serious reservations; and, when there is disagreement, it is presented in a way which lays blame elsewhere, often polarising opinion and failing to challenge core assumptions. The series of problems associated with top teams become particularly acute when the nature of the tasks to be undertaken are complex, embarrassing or threatening.
Senge’s contribution, with its emphasis on a systems perspective, an integrative set of disciplines and recognition of a suite of ‘disabilities’ preventing its execution, is to date the most cohesive exposition of the learning organization concept, particularly in its second edition where original research propositions (hypotheses) have been subjected to empirical, evidence-based scrutiny. Despite this, Senge’s fifth discipline concept suffers the same fate which many sociological, psychological or economic labels encounter when attached to ‘organization’: it reifies what is at best an abstract concept. The tendency to refer to organizations as ‘living things’, rather than as an entity composed of groups and individuals, is a common feature of the management literature. In the learning organization literature, this has been a notable problem, leading to a conceptual and definitional ambiguity which has stifled the practical adoption of what could otherwise be an extremely powerful idea. There have, though, been a number of publications under the umbrella ‘brand’ ‘A Fifth Discipline Resource’, for example, ‘The Dance of Change: The Challenges to Sustaining Momentum in a Learning Organization’ (Senge et al., 1999). Senge himself remains committed to developing the broad theme of organization-wide learning as a preferable change management approach than ‘inspirational leadership’ (see Chapter Eight, Implementing Global Business Strategy, for insights into ‘inspired leadership’).
(For a brief overview of the key issues relating to leadership in global business strategy here, see The Global Business Strategy Album post: Chelsea 0 Manchester City 0: A Leadership dilemma).
Shaping the future
From the preceding discussion it is clear that in the context of change a premium is placed on organizational learning and, in a more pro-active sense, we can argue that the importance of managerial actions comes to the fore. By this, we refer to the fact that companies are not merely passive receivers of, and reactors to, business environmental stimuli. They can shape their own future to the extent that their managers can intervene in and successfully interrupt an otherwise ‘normal’ progression of events.
There is a pattern of management literature emerging which increasingly proposes that organizational advantage is the most sustainable form of competitive edge, particularly where markets are mature and/or deregulated and where technology transfer is in flux. This new framework for academic research and business practice has the following general characteristics:
- Customer (versus supervisor) focus.
- Continuous performance improvement (kaizen) versus meeting periodically defined objectives;
- Teams versus excessively hierarchical relationships.
- Flat, flexible, ‘organic’, ‘agile’ organizational design rather than vertical, static structures and business processes.
- Empowerment versus (excessive) compliance.
- Vision and value-driven versus control-oriented leadership.
Prosperous companies demonstrate some or all these characteristics and can be differentiated from their less successful counterparts on the listed criteria. On the downside, there are far more of the latter as organizations demonstrate their well-known tendency towards inertia, often leaving more attractive ‘blue ocean’ opportunities for nimbler, agile companies to exploit. The twin tasks for senior executives are to challenge misconceptions among managers and to foster a working environment which facilitates rather than constrains change. This is particularly true where firms have internationalized and, in the process, face novel competitive challenges from both global and indigenous rivals.
In their influential book, Managing Across Borders, written on the cusp of the ‘new globalization’ (see Chapter One), Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) addressed these issues and warned companies of the dangers of “administrative heritage” whereby the “heavy weight of past choices” constrain the appropriate decisions for contemporary and emerging competitive conditions. This becomes even more apparent when dealing with the ‘softer’ realities of organizational advantage.
(See The Global Business Strategy Album EndNote essay Organizational capabilities for global business strategy success for further insights here).
In the process of the globalization of the world economy and the internationalization of their business operations, companies tend to move beyond the boundaries of their existing knowledge base, away from the context of relative certainty to a milieu characterised by ambiguity and – in many cases – distrust. For many companies, the task is not merely to learn – very often the immediate mission is learning to learn. A requirement for such knowledge transfer applies to both externalities and internal organizational issues, particularly for multi-national, multi-divisional companies or for smaller companies with global business strategy ambitions.
Changes in strategic direction and its counterpart, organizational restructuring, are not new phenomena, particularly in discontinuous business environments. The key difference between the current phase of organizational change and those of the past is the greater intensity of competition and the progressive trend towards deregulation and liberalisation of markets. The tricky task is somehow overlaying short and medium-term organizational change processes onto long term global business strategies. In addressing this challenge many organizations have had the limits of their capabilities exposed.
Much of the organizational transformation literature makes the implicit assumption that appending a change programme (more of which later) to the corporate transformation process will achieve the task of implementing the re-engineering project. This conflation of process and implementation is a very common but very flawed feature of the strategic management literature (see Mintzberg, 2011, for a comprehensive critique). Fundamentally, the arbitrary combination of these two disparate constructs is conceptually inept. Describing the nuances of the divide, Professor David Wilson (1992), an eminent academic whose major contributions to the literature relate to both change and leadership, is worth quoting at length:
To understand the implementation of change is to place the management … of individuals at centre stage. This means implementing preconceived models of change, all with the aim of achieving a particular set of expected, predetermined and desired outcomes. To understand the process of change is to examine critically the context, the antecedents and the movement and history of changes, keeping at the same time an analytical eye on the organization theories-in-use which inform such an analysis.
Wilson describes a conceptual impasse between ‘contextualists’, who aim to characterise and understand the complexity of the process environment, and the ‘implementors’, who are keen to define roles, competencies, skills and managerial techniques for the successful achievement of stated objectives. The obvious complexity of managing change and the critical challenge of strategy implementation often appear to defy analysis. What is clear, however, is that simple solutions packaged as radical agendas are unlikely to break the mould of organizational inertia. As has been discussed throughout this book, if a strategy cannot be implemented it is not a strategy at all.
Ultimately, as we have aimed to demonstrate in the last two chapters, operationalising organizational solutions falls fairly and squarely on the shoulders of leadership and management. And, with this observation noted, we give the final words of this chapter to Canadian professor Henry Mintzberg (2011) who for more than four decades has consistently profiled the realities of the management task when confronted by organizational complexity:
Managing is rife with conundrums. Every way a manager turns, there seems to be some paradox or enigma lurking.
In the next and final chapter, we add one more layer of complexity: the strategic management challenges associated with the numerous paradoxes encountered when addressing the diverse demands of multiple stakeholders.
Recommended resources for further inquiry
For readers interested in a more detailed exploration of the subject of change management, this author’s recommended textbook, based upon the multiple criteria introduced in the ‘Introduction to the Global Business Strategy Blog’ and extracted here is: Cameron and Green (2015) Making Sense of Change Management: A Complete Guide to the Models, Tools and Techniques of Organizational Change.
Since this chapter is an extension of our discussion of ‘Theories of Organizational Behaviour and Strategic Management’ from Chapter Ten, we again recommend the following textbook for insights into the organizational behaviour dimensions of managing change: Buchanan and Huczynski (2016), Organizational Behaviour.
Outside Fortress Europe Excerpt References
Bartlett, C. A., & Ghosal, S. (1989). Managing Across Borders. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Cameron, E., & Green, M. (2015). Making Sense of Change Management: A Complete Guide to the Models, Tools and Techniques of Organizational Change (4 ed.). London: Kogan Page.
Kanter, R. M. (1983). The Changemasters: Corporate Entrepreneurs at Work. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Kanter, R. M. (1989). When Giants Learn to Dance: Mastering the Challenges of Strategy. London: Unwin.
Kanter, R. M., Stein, B. A., & Jick, T. D. (2001). The Challenge of Organizational Change: How Companies Experience it and Leaders Guide it. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Kotter, J. P. (2012). Leading Change, With a New Preface by the Author. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press.
Mintzberg, H. (2011). Managing. Harlow: Financial Times/Prentice Hall.
Senge, P. M. (2006). The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (2 ed.). New York: Doubleday.
Senge, P. M., Kleiner, A., Roberts, C., Ross, R. B., Roth, G., & Smith, B. (1999). The Dance of Change: The Challenges to Sustaining Momentum in a Learning Organization. New York: Currency.
Wilson, D. C. (1992). A Strategy of Change: Concepts and Controversies in the Management of Change. London: Routledge.
Please click/tap your browser ‘Back’ button to return to the location navigated from. Alternatively, click/tap the ‘Antique Keyboard’ graphic below to navigate to The Global Business Strategy Album page.
All content © Colin Edward Egan, 2020